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I Introduction
For several years suthors have discussed from a theoretical point of view
whether or not in a purely competitive setting a Customs Union (CU) is
preferable to a Unilateral Tariff Reduction (UTR). If not, the creation of
CU's could be ill-advised. Cooper and Massel [1965] argued that the poten-
tial (static) gains from a CU -trade creation- could also be achieved by a
UTR, where the potential negative effects -trade diversion- could be
avoided. Hence, UTR was preferable and the actual existence of CU's had to
be explained by less rigorous 'dynamic' or political effects. In a sense,
the resort to a difference between social and private costs and goals (see
Johnson [1965], for example) could also be included under this heading.
Wonnacott and Wonnacott [1981], however, signaled a forgotten advantage of
a CU over UTR: the increased access of a country to its partner's market.
They showed that due to increased mutual trade the partners of a CU would
reach a higher social indifference curve than the one attainable under
UTR. But Nicolaides [1987] argued that the arrangement they discussed was
not a CU (i.e., was not a form of preferentia] trade liberalisation), but
an undiscriminatory fall in tariffs: the outside world would end up
without international trade and, consequently, the common external tariff
would have no meaning. Moreover, he proved that in the same classical set-
ting the creation of CU's is an unlikely outcome if, starting in a
framework of international protection, countries would pursue their self-
interest. Unilateral tariff reduction, if any, would be more likely.
This leaves the discussion in a rather unsatisfying phase: whereas theory
seems to condemn CU's, in reality they are formed and expanded.l Given
internally consistent theories, this difference must either be attributed
to a difference in opinion between politicians and economists regarding
1 For a descriptive overview of actual CU's, see E1-Agraa [1988].z
the relevant model, and~or to their respective opinions of how 'welfare'
should be defined.
The present article addresses the original question: can the choice of
countries to form CU's rather than to unilaterally reduce their tariffs be
defended (explained) on theoretical grounds if we leave aside possible
differences between private and social costs, if we do not rely on public
choice theory and we stick to the original assumption of competitive
markets?
But our approach differs in two respects when compared to the above men-
tioned articles. The latter discussed this question in what we will call
the classical setting traditionally used in trade theory, where all
markets clear and as a consequence production is at full capacity, where
the factor endowment bundles are constant, and where the welfare level is
measured by the number of goods consumed (social indifference curve). In
that setting, apart from the 'optimal tariff' argument and the infant in-
dustry argvment, in general, the market leads to maximal welfare.
The first difference is, that the present article replaces the model by a
flexible prices-flexible output type of multi-country framework with
capital accumulation (to get also long run outcomes), where factors of
production (labour) can be underutilized, due to a labour market that is
distorted because of a nominally constant wage rate.
Secondly, 'welfare' is measured in two ways now. First, we look at the
impact of the commercial policy on the goals of economic policy as they
are generally accepted in western economies: the level of production, the
rate of unemployment and the balance of payments.2 In addition, the im-
pact on the government account is analysed. If these four items are
favourably influenced, we conclude that the commercial policy is suc-
cessful in 'keynesian terms'. Second, like the traditional CU approach, we
take as a'classical' indicator for 'welfare' the level of consumption.
Simulating the model, we will first demonstrate that the existence of
global protection is rationally explained on other grounds in this model
than in classical CU theory: the changes in the terms of trade reached for
2 We leave out price stability here. A change in tariffs will in general
cause changes in the price level. As commercial policy is nevertheless
carried out in practice, apparently the achievement of stable prices
is not a major argument at this point.3
by protectíon in the latter approach will appear to be of a temporary
nature, due to the variability of factors of production. Secondly, we will
argue that countries are likely to subsequently form a CU, rather than
reduce their tariffs unilaterally. Moreover, in the light of the enlar-
gements of the EC, the question is addressed whether an increase in the
number of participants of the CU is beneficial for the previous partners
and~or for the new partner (in which case enlargement of the CU is likely
to occur). In the analysis we will explicitly investigate the consequences
for the outside world of these respective forms of commercial policy.
The results to be presented suggest that political decisions in this con-
text are taken bearing in mind a keynesian model rather than a classical
line of thought. The two welfare indicators, however, do not appear to
contradict.
Section two describes the model. The simulation results are discussed in
section three. Section four summarizes the conclusions.
II The Model
We apply a symmetric macro-economic model for four large countries
(labelled 1, 2, 3 and 4) with flexible output and flexible prices, of
which the main equations and definitions of symbols are described in the
Appendix. The countries are large in order to have in principle flexible
terms of trade, a major source of changing welfare in classical CU theory
(See Nicolaides [198~], Wooton [1986]). In each country, consumer demand
for home produced and imported products equals net labour income3, in-
vestments are determined by lagged net profits (where profits equal sales
minus wage costs and capital costs, and investment products are bought in
the home country only), and real material government expenditures are
exogenous. Relative international prices (after tariffs 4 and corrected
for exchange rates) determine the ratio of real home consumption over im-
ports. The Appendix also gives the formula for determination of the
respective trade flows:
3 We make the traditional assumption that tariff revenues are
redistributed to consumers.
4 Imports can be charged with possibly discriminatory import tariffs. We
disregard transport costs and the like.4
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In a closed world economy, the final category in demand, exports, equals
the imports by Lhe remaining (three) countries out of the economy
concerned.
In production, following a Cobb-Douglas production function, firms combine
under perfect competition labour and capital (both homogeneous). In the
short run, the amount of labour employed can vary, whereas capital is
fixed, due to an installation lag of one period of investments. Output
prices and production are found by the intersection of demand and supply,
where the latter is derived by combining the production function with the
assumption of profit maximization. Given capital, the output volume deter-
mines labour demand. Constant labour supply and the short run capital
volume restrict maximum short run output.
International mobility of production factors is ruled out and nominal
wages and exchange rates are fixed. Unemployment benefits, paid by the
government, are lower than the wage rate.
III The Simulations
In a classical setting, given the large country assumption, the emergence
of global protection is based on the optimal tariff argument: the first
country will improve its terms of trade by raising an import tariff, and
the other large countries will subsequently retaliate to ameliorate their
deteriorated terms of trade. In our setting, however, the emergence of
global protection does not hinge upon the large country assumption (in
reality, also small countries levy import tariffs), and if large countries
are assumed, as in the model presented above, the terms of trade advantage
is only one of the possible arguments for protection. Moreover, it only
holds in the short (and intermediate) run. Other arguments hold both in
the short and in the long run. This is illustrated as follows.5
5 The simulations presented are based on E- 0.08~, ~- 0.8, O- 5.
Simulations with alternative parameter values produced similar
results.5
We start from free trade. Table 1, column 1, gives the -stationary- star-
ting values. What happens in country 1 if it raises its tariff uniformly?
In the short run, as a consequence of the switch in expenditures by its
inhabitants, spending in that country goes up, stimulating output. See
Table 1, column 2. As capital is fixed initially, employment goes up even
stronger. At the same time, due to its increased output prices (causing
its exports to fall slightly) atid lower output prices in the outside world
(caused by lower demand for their products by country 1), country one's
terms of trade impi-ove. The fall in import demand leads to a surplus in
the balance of payments.6 The government runs a surplus, explained by
fewer unemployment benefits. Firm profits go up: higher output prices at
constant labour costs.
In the longer run, those increased profits cause an expansion of the
capital stock, i.e., an outward shift of the supply curve. This mitigates
prices and profits again. In the outside world the opposite occurs.
Gradually, output prices (and hence, the terms of trade) as well as
capital~labour ratios return to their initial levels. A new equilibrium is
found, with higher production and employment and, as a result of fewer
unemployment benefits, a positive surplus on the government account.
As far as 'welfare' is concerned, all elements of the keynesian welfare
indicator have improved in the intervening country, both in the short and
in the long run. The protecting country improved its terms of trade in the
short run. But in the long run, they must be unaffected: for a stationary
equilibrium to be established, the capital stock should be constant, i.e.,
net profits should be zero. In other words, the gap between (constant)
wages and output prices should be unaffected. Hence, output prices, and
consequently the terms of trade, are not affected in the long run. This
major source of classical welfare change is therefore ruled out in the
long run. T~e short run positive terms of trade effect is in the long run
replaced by a positive supply shift. Nevertheless, the level of total
private consumption (cotm in the table) goes up, not as a result of
increased terms of trade, but due to increased employment: employed
6 A surplus in the trade account results, even in the long run. Of
course, policy interventions or sutomatic (monetary) adjustment
mechanisms will 'cure' this. We do not deal here with those effects.
Nevertheless, see below (main text).Table 1: The effects of undiscríminatoy protection and retaliation
colmn: 1 2 - 3
Starting undisciminatory protection Retaliation by 2, 3, 4
value by country 1 in all periods in period 2
period: 1 1 2 EQ. 1 2 Q.
1'1 loo.ooo Y1 lOZ.ozl 102.096 103.077 Y1 lOZ.o21 100.076 l00.000
Y4 loo.ooo Y4 99.3236 99.z984 98.9743 Y4 99.3z36 99.975 l00.000
CO1 60.0000 CO1 62.1223 62.1202 62.4880 Col 62.1223 62.1795 62.1818
M1 16.000o M1 13.8977 13.9007 13.886z M1 13.897ï 13.8211 13.818z
co1.M1 76.000o co1.M1 76.0200 76.ozo9 76.374z CO1~M1 7ó.ozo0 76.0006 76.0000
C04 60.0000 C04 60.0207 60.0214 59-9015 C04 60.0207 62.1826 62.1818
M4 1ó.000o M4 15.9699 15.9688 15-9737 M4 15.9699 13.817z 13.8182
C04.M4 76.0000 C04~M4 75-9906 75.9902 75.8752 C04~M4 75.9906 75.9998 76.0000
11 z0.ooo0 11 20.0000 20.0808 20.6154 11 20.0000 20.081z zo.0oo0
14 20.0000 14 20.0000 19-97z9 19.7949 14 zo.ooo0 19.9730 20.0000
Exl 16.0000 Fxl 15-8986 15.8949 15.9737 Exl 15.8986 13.8149 13.818z
~x4 16.000o Ex4 15.3oz9 15.3040 15.z779 Ex4 15.3oz9 13.8193 13.818z
S1 N o.0000o S1 N 2.104zo 2.10131 z.o8753 S1 N 2.104zo -.00278 -.00000
S4 ti 0.00000 S4 N -.70140 -.70044 -.69584 S4 N -.70140 0.00093 0.00000
PY1 l.0000o PY1 l.00501 l.oo5zo l.0000o PY1 l.00501 l.00019 l.00000
P~á l.ooooo PY4 0.99830 0.99824 1.0000o PY4 0.99830 0.99994 l.00000
P1 1.00000 P1 1.04564 1.04577 1.04211 P1 1.04564 1.04224 1.04211
Py 1.00000 P4 0.99878 0.99873 1.0000o P4 0.998;8 1.04206 1.04z11
LW: 100.000 LM1 102.532 102.627 103.077 LM1 loz.532 100.094 100.000
LM- 100.00o LM4 99.155z 99.1238 98.9743 LM4 99-155z 99.969 loo.ooo
~- loo.ooo K1 loo.ooo loo.ooo l03.077 xl l00.000 loo.oo0 100.000
Ki 100.000 K4 100.000 100.000 98.9743 K4 i00.000 100.000 100.000
~"L- ` 80.0000 YL1 N 82.0260 82.1014 82.4617 YL1 N 82.0260 80.0756 80.0000
YL4 N 80.000o YL4 N 79-3241 79.2990 79-1794 YL4 N 79-3241 79.9749 80.0000
}~~ ti 0.00000 YR1 N 0.40621 0.42137 0.00000 YR1 N 0.40621 0.01512 -.00001
5'R4 ti 0.00000 YR4 N -.13506 -.14007 -.0000o YR4 N -.13506 -.U0503 0.00000
L1 z.982~1 ul 0.96819 0.89324 0.53508 U1 0.96819 2.90697 z.98z1o
U4 z.98z11 u4 3.65393 3-67889 3-79778 u4 3.65393 3-~709 z.98z11
0.00000 F1 1.69799 2.00491 2.08753 F1 1.69799 0.30707 0.00000
F4 0.0000o F4 -.56634 -.66841 -.69584 F4 -.56634 -.10209 -.ooooo
1o.es: :ariffs are either zero or 20X: Parameters: e- 0.0889, ~ - 0.8, 9- 5. Symbols:
in real terms: y- firm output, cotm - privately consumed goods, produced at home and abroad,resp.,
i- investment, EX - exports, LM - employment, k- capital stock, u- rate of unemployment
in ~alue: SN - trade balance, PY - price of home produced goods, P- overall price index,
YLN - firm wage bill, YRN - gross firm profits, F - surplus on government account
1- country 1, 4- country 4(one of the outside countries). EQ - new long run equilibriumreceive a higher income than unemployed.~
We conclude, that in this model unilateral protection payes in all
respects. The basic reason is that demand switches to the protecting
country, and away from the outside countries. As a result, the latter
countries suffer in all respects.8
Subsequently, it is equally rational for the other countries to retalíate.
Table 1, column 3, gives the effects, if in period 2 countries 2, 3 and 4
levy an import tariff equal to the one previously imposed by country 1.
Although in that period country 1 still keeps a small part of its original
advantage attributable to the fact that its protection came earlier (and
caused higher profits and therefore now a higher investment activity), its
advantage already shrinks substantially. In the long run, the sole
remaining impact of world wide protection is a switch from internationally
traded to home made products in all countries: a reduction in inter-
national trade, due to the fact that imports are made equally unattractive
in all countries. The countervailing duty fades out all negative effects
that were previously perceived in the outside world by the tariff
installed by country 1.
So far, we conclude that a tariff improves both keynesian and classical
welfare, both in the short and in the long run, that it harms welfare in
the rest of the world, and that retaliation is an effective answer. Like
in reality, without international cooperation, world wide protection is
the result.
If we take this protective world as a starting point ( see Table 2, column
1), does the creation of a Customs Union (CU), let us say between
countries 1 and 2, improve welfare in the partner countries? Or is a
unilateral or world wide tariff reduction a better advise?
~ The consumption increase would have been higher, if we would have
assumed a labour tax rate that endogenously adapts in order to result
in a zero government surplus. If this way the now positive surplus on
the government account would have been given to households, their
spending would have increased and the long run surplus on the trade
balance would have disappeared.
8 If it is taken into account that the current model deals with four
symmetrical countries, the gain in output and employment for country





















Y1 loo.ooo n l00.000 100.103 100.156 Y1 loo.oo0 97.9720 96.9335 Y4 100.00o Y4 loo.oo0 99.897 99.844 Y4 100.000 100.673 lOl.OZ2
coi 62.1818 coi 6z.1818 61.4340 61.4524 Col 62.1818 60.0641 59.7058
Mi 13.8182 M1 13.818z 14.5668 14.5665 M1 13.8182 15.9086 15.9215
CO1~M1 76.0000 C1~M1 76.0000 76.0008 76.0189 C1aMi 76.0000 75.9727 75.6273
co4 62.1818 co4 62.1818 62.1850 6z.1663 Co4 6z.i818 6z.1613 6z.2835
M4 13.8182 M4 13.8182 13.814z 13.8147 M4 13.818z 13.8450 13.8408
CO4.M4 76.0000 C4.M4 76.0000 75.9992 75.9810 C4.M4 76.0000 76.0063 76.1243
I1 20.0000 I1 20.0000 20.0000 20.0312 I1 20.0000 20.0000 19.3869
14 20.0000 14 20.0000 20.0000 19.9688 14 20.0000 20.0000 20.2044
Exi 13.818z Exi 13.818z 14.6687 14.6723 Exl 13.8182 13.9079 13.8408
Ex4 13.818z Ex4 13.8182 13.7123 13.709o Ex4 13.818z 14.5119 14.5343
S1 N -.0000o sl N -.oooo0 0.10656 0.10576 si N -.OOOOO -z.0985 -2.0807
S4 N -.ooooo S4 N -.00000 -.10656 -.10576 54 N -.00000 0.69949 0.69357
PY1 1.00000 PY1 1.00000 1.00026 1.0000o PY1 i.ooo00 0.99489 l.ooooo
PY4 1.00000 PY4 1.00000 0.99974 1.00000 PY4 1.00000 1.00168 i.00000
P1 1.04211 P1 1.04211 1.02825 1.02807 PI 1.04211 0.99632 1.00000
P4 1.04211 P4 1.04211 1.04192 1.04211 P4 1.04211 1.04328 1.04211
LMI 100.00o LM1 100.000 lo0.lz8 100.156 LM1 l00.000 97.4714 96.9332
LM4 l00.00o LM4 100.000 99.872 99.844 LM4 l00.000 100.842 1oi.o22
xl l00.000 K1 l00.000 l00.000 100.156 K1 100.000 100.000 96.9346
K4 100.000 K4 100.000 100.000 99.844 K4 100.000 100.000 101.022
YL1 N 80.0000 YL1 N 80.0000 80.1027 80.1247 YL1 N 80.0000 77.9772 77.5465
YL4 N 80.0000 YL4 N 80.0000 79.8973 79.8753 YL4 N 80.0000 80.6738 80.8178
YRi N o.ooooo YR1 N O.OOOOO 0.02053 0.00001 YR1 N o.ooooo -.40353 -.oooz3
YR4 N 0.00000 YR4 N 0.00000 -.02053 -.00001 YR4 N 0.00000 0.13486 0.00008
ul 2.98211 ui 2.98211 2.88006 2.85815 ui 2.9821i 4.99239 5.42094
u4 2.98211 U4 z.98211 3.08416 3.10607 u4 2.98211 2.31237 z.16916
Fi o.ooooo F1 0.0000~ ~.08603 0.10576 F1 0.00000 -1.6949 -2.0807
F4 0.00000 F4 0.00000 -.08603 -.10576 F4 0.00000 0.56463 0.69356
For definitions of symbols: See notes Tahle 1.
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The third alternative, a world wide reduction of tariffs, would simply
imply a redistribution of world spending towards more internationally
traded goods as indicated by the free trade starting position from above
(Table 1, column 1), without impact on 'welfare'. The first alternative (
a CU) improves welfare, the second worsens it, as is explained as follows.
As far as the CU is concerned (Table 2, column 2), of course, intra block
trade increases (after tariff prices of the partner's products fall), at
the expense of consumption of home produced goods. The major and positive
impact on production -and consequently on employment and the government
account (fewer unemployment benefits)- however, stems from trade diver-
sion: consumers in the member countries buy more inside the CU and less in
the outside world.9 For a formal derivation of trade diversion the
reader is referred to the Appendix. In the table it is indicated by the
fall in EX4, the exports by country 4. Obviously, the partners' trade
balances are influenced positively. Moreover, this diversion of demand to
the CU forces output and employment in the member countries up, as well as
output prices, at the expense of their counterparts in the outside world.
The terms of trade for the block countries improve. As described above, in
the long run this is replaced by an outward shift of the supply curve in-
side the CU and an inward shift of that same curve outside the CU (as a
result of positive and negative capital accumulation, respectively), until
the initial price levels and capital labour ratios are restored. In that
new long run equilibrium, unemployment in the CU is lower and, as a conse-
quence, the government budget surplus is higher. Outside the CU the
reverse holds.
The keynesian welfare indicators (production, employment, trade balance,
government surplus) are influenced positively inside the CU, and
negatively outside the CU. The classical welfare indicator (level of
consumption) is analogously affected, due to the fact that employed con-
sume more than unemployed.10 In sum, the creation of a CU benefits the
partners, but harms the outside world.
9 Trade diversion is defined here this way, as in this setting with
internationally imperfectly substitutable prod~~rts, one can hardly
refer to 'more efficient producers of the (samF~' ~mport product'.
10 Again, this effect would have been strong~.~ if the respective
governments would pass on their surplus (CU) or their deficit (rest of
the world) to households.10
The second alternative, UTR, however, lowers expenditures in the country
Freeing trade, say country 1, as its consumers switch to the outside
world. See Table 2, column 3. The consequences are evident: lower output
(and employment) in the home country produced at lower output prices; in
the short run losses are incurred, which causes the capital stock to
shr.ink in the longer run. Increased imports by country 1 not only causes
its balance of payments to worsen, but also serves as an opposite impulse
on the outside world. There, demand increases with positive effects on
production, employment, capital formation and the government surplus. The
deterioration in the terms of trade experienced by country 1 in the short
run, is in the long run replaced by a negatíve supply shock. The un-
favourable (favourable) impact on keynesian welfare in country 1(the
other countries) is again in line with the one on classical welfare, for
reasons explained above.
Concluding, in a protective world economy, raising a CU improves (nationa-
list) welfare, world wide tariff reductions leave welfare unaffected, and
UTR harms (nationalist) welfare. For the outside world, the ranking is
opposite. Obviously, these conclusions directly contrast with the ones
obtained in the traditional CU approach.
Summarizing the results reached so far, we expect the following: if free
trade prevails, one or more countries will protect their economies by
raising an import tariff, the other countries retaliate, and global
protection will apply. Subsequently, a CU is expected rather than un-
discriminatory tariff reductions.
Finally, can we expect an enlargement of this CU?
This enlargement will take place if the members of the new block as a
whole are better of than before. It is most likely to be initiated by a
country detecting a potential gain. In Table 3, column 1 gives the effects
of a CU between countries 1 and 2 from period 1 onwards, and column 2
provides the results if in period 2 country 3 is added. The differences
between the respective columns are the effects of the enlargement.
Concentrating first on the keynesian welfare indicators, where output is
the central variable, following enlargement total output in countries 1
and 2 is hardly influenced, but the one in 3 is improved substantially. In11
Table 3: The eff:cts of enlarQement of a Customs Union
column: 1 2
Global protection and CU Country 3 joins CU
between 1.2 in all periods in period 2
period: 1 2 EQ. 1 2 gQ-
Yi 100.]03 100.106 100.156
Y3 99-897 99.893 99-844
Y4 99.897 99.893 99.844
YL 100.103 100.105 100.154
Y3 99.897 l00.098 1oo.i54
Y4 99-897 99-692 99-538
Col 61.4340 61.4339 61.4524
ci.Ml 76.0008 76.0008 76.0189
Co3 6z.185o 62.1851 62.1663
c3tM3 75.9992 75.9991 75-9810
C04 62.1850 62.1851 62.1663
C4.M4 75.9992 75.9991 75.9810
il 20.000o zo.oo41 zo.o3lz
13 20.0000 19.9959 19-9688
14 20.0000 19.9959 19.9688
Exl 14.6687 14.6685 14.6723
Ex3 13-7123 13.7125 13.7090
Ex4 13.7123 13.71z5 13.7090
M1 14.5668 14.5669 14.5665
M3 ]3.814z 13.814o i3.8147
M4 13.814z i3.8140 13.8147
M12 5.46080 5.46079 5.46244
M13 4.55300 4.55308 4.55203
M14 4.55300 4.55308 4.55zo3
M21 5.46080 5.46079 5.46244
M23 4.553~ 4.55308 4.55203
M24 4.55300 4.55308 4.55203
M3i 4.60393 4.60385 4.60491
M3z 4.60393 4.60385 4.60491
M34 4.60630 4.60631 4.60491
M41 4.60393 4.60385 4.60491
M42 4.60393 4.60385 4.60491













11 20.0000 20.0041 20.0308
13 zo.ooo0 19.9959 20.0308
14 20.0000 19.9959 19.9076
Exi 14.6687 15.3943 15.3982
~3 13.7123 ]5-3946 15-3982
Ex4 13.7123 13.5043 13.4945
ML 14.5668 15-z939 15.2937
M3 ]3-8142 15.2936 15-2937
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S1 N 0.10656 0.1o64z o.10576 sl N o.10656 0.10515 0.10451
S3 N -.10656 -.1064z -.10576 S3 K -.10656 0.10547 0.10451
S4 N -.1065~, -.10642 -.10576 S4 N -.10656 -.31577 -.31352
PY1 1.00026 1.00027 1.00000 PY1 1.00026 1.00026 1.00000
PY3 0.99974 0.99973 l.ooooo PY3 0.99974 l.00024 i.ooooo
PY4 0.99974 0.99973 l.ooooo PY4 0.99974 0.99923 l.ooooo
Pi 1.028z5 1.02825 1.02t307 P1 1.02825 .01421 1.01404
P3 1.04192 1.04192 1.04211 P3 1.04192 1.01420 1.01404
P4 1.04192 1.04192 1.04211 P4 1.04192 1.04156 1.04210
LM1 ?o0.i28 100.133 100.156 LMi 100.128 100.132 100.154
LM3 99.872 99.867 99.844 LM3 99.872 io0.122 100.154
LM4 99.87z 99.867 99.844 LM4 99.872 99.615 99.538
xl loo.ooo loo.ooo l00.156 xl loo.ooo loo.ooo l00.154
K3 loo.ooo l00.000 99.844 x3 loo.oo0 100.000 l00.154
K4 100.000 100.000 99.844 K4 l00.000 i0o.o00 99.538
YL1 N 80.1027 80.1065 80.1247 YL1 x 80.1027 80.1053 80.1232
YL3 N 79.8973 79.8935 79.8753 YL3 N 79.8973 80.0976 80.1232
YL4 rv 79.8973 79.8935 79.8753 YL4 N 79.8973 79.6918 79.6303
YR1 N o.ozo53 o.ou 30 0.00001 YR1 N o.ozo53 0.02105 0.ooooi
YR3 N -.ozo53 -.ozlz9 -.ooool YR3 N -.ozo53 0.01953 0.00001
YR4 N -.02053 -.02129 -.00001 YR4 x -.ozo53 -.06161 -.00003
ul 2.88006 2.876z6 2.85815 ul 2.88006 2.87748 2.85961
u3 3.08416 3.08796 3.10607 U3 3.08416 2.88504 2.85962
u4 3.08416 3.08796 3.10607 u4 3.08416 3.28846 3.34958
F1 0.08603 0.10155 0.10576 ~1 0.08603 0.10053 0.10450
F3 -.08603 -.10155 -.10576 P3 -.08603 0.06951 0.10450
F4 -.08603 -.10155 -.10576 F4 -.08603 -.z7058 -.31351
For definitions of symbols: See notes Table 1.13
the former members (1 and 2) a switch occurs between consumption in the
home country (co) and imports out of the new member 3. See equation (A) in
the Appendix. This negative effect on demand in those countries is largely
compensated by the extra import demand by country 3 out of countries 1 and
2. Largely, but not for the full 100 per cent. The reason is, that due to
customs union formation between 1 and 2(period 1), a demand impulse on
those countries' economies was established leading to higher output prices
and, as a result, positive profits. In the current period (period 2) this
leads to higher demand (for investment purposes) in those countries, which
leads to higher output prices. As seen above, before the enlargement of
the CU in countries 3 and 4 the opposite phenomena was obtained. Hence,
when enlarging the CU, the output prices in country 3 are lower than those
in countries 1 and 2. So, although in 1, 2 and 3 the mutual import tariffs
are equal, in equation (A) the competitive position of country 3 is better
than the ones of 1 and 2(Py3 ( Py2 - Pyl) and for country 3 a trade
balance surplus (S3N) is found which exceeds the one of the previous mem-
ber countries. Due to this price difference, consumers in 1 and 2 switch
to 3-products slightly more than is compensated by extra exports to 3, and
total production in 1 and 2 slightly falls. This phenomenon is il-
lustrated by the trade matrix also included in Table 3: m13- m~3~ m31- m3~
(where mij refers to imports by i from j, see period 2, column 2).
The outside world is harmed by the enlargement: the increased demand for
3-products by 1 and 2, as well as the increased demand for 1- and 2-
products by 3, partly goes at the expense of demand for 4 products: trade
diversion (see again Appendix for the formal derivation). In the trade
matríx: mj4 falls.
The initial advantage in terms of trade of the previous CU members over
the newly accepted member (column 2, period 2), disappears in time, due to
subsequent adjustments in the capital stock. The same holds for the terms
of trade advantage of the CU members over country 4(whose prices fall due
to enlargement).
In the long run, where all prices return to 1, the economics of the en-
larged CU are in an equal position. World production and employment return
to their initial levels (400). Country 3, the new member, benefits from
the enlargement: its share in production rises. This goes at the expense
of the previous members (a lower impetus on demand as a result of their14
unfavourable competitive position in the enlargement-period), but
especially at the expense of the outside world. As the latter country (the
outside world), takes part of the burden, the advantage for the new member
must exceed the (summed) disadvantage for the previous CU members. The
other determinants of keynesian welfare develop analogously. And due to
the connection through the rate of employment between this welfare in-
dicator and the one referring to classical welfare, this also applies to
the latter.
Hence, if a CU exi5ts, which, as we saw, would be a logical step after
global protection, the next rational step is enlargement of that CU. As
the new member is the one that can expect a gain, we expect 'outsiders' to
take the initiative. This is also what we observe in practice with EC en-
largements. As the former CU members mildly loose, we expect them to
largely dictate the 'terms of entrance' and to try and shift part of the
gain of the iiew member to themselves.
Although enlargements of a CU are likely, the ultimate CU, i.e., a return
to free trade is unlikely: this would imply a lower welfare. (Compare
columns 1(or 2) of Table 3 with Table 1, column 1). Enlargement of a CU
is only interesting as long as there is an outside world that contributes
to the increased welfare of the (enlarged) block.
IV Conclusions
The wide gap between actual commercial policy and the ones justified by
classical trade theory may have two origins. First, a difference in
opinion between politicians and theorists of how 'welfare' should be
defined. Second, a difference in their respective opinions about the
relevant model.
Regarding the former possibility, we suggested an alternative measure for
'welfare'. With regard to the latter, we proposed a symmetrical four
country macro-economic model with output and price flexibility. Essential
distinctions between this model and the one commonly used in CU analysis,
are the assumed capital accumulatíon as well as the assumed constant
nominal wage rate. The latter opens up the possibility of a labour market
out of equilibrium.15
This model was applied to various types of commercial policy. In all cases
it appeared that the short run terms of trade effects, crucial in clas-
sical CU theory, were temporary and were replaced by supply side effects
in the long run.
Moreover, rather than the classícal model, our model seems appropriate to
explain actual (and predict future':) general behaviour of commercial
poli.cy. Applying both yardsticks of 'welfare'll, it was made plausible
that a free trade world will not last long, protection is likely and will
be followed by retaliation, leading to a world of protection; that in a
protective world economy, CU's will be created (rather than unilateral or
other tariff reductions) that will subsequently be enlarged; that the en-
largements will be initiated by outside countries; that the previous
members will largely dictate the 'terms of entrance'; that CU's and their
enlargements will go at the expense of the rest of the world; and that the
enlargements will not go as far as the ultimate CU, i.e., they will not
lead to global free trade.
Appendix
The main equations for country i read as follows (N-nominal, symbols
without suffix refer to the 'home' country i, all countries are structured
similarly, j - 1...4):
(1) YN - CON t IN t GN t EXN
where Y- demand, CO - consumption of home produced goods, G-
government expenditures, EX - exports;
(2) CON t MN - NHI
where MN - pre-tariff value of imports (tariff revenue is
redistributed),
NHI - nominal net household income - YL (firm wage bill) t TRF
(social security payments) - BL (direct household taxes);
(3) co - CON
Y
where Py - price in home currency of home produced good;
(4) MN - ~ mijPYJF~ij
j
j~i
(5) mij - E co (PYlI
(PYj(litij)ERi~) )
11 I.e., they did not contradict in our framework.16
where E- parameter, tij - import tariff levied by i on imports out of
j, ERi - exchange rate (number of currency i per unit currency j);
( 6 ) y - .~~k 1-~
production function with y- output, ,~ - private employment,
k- capital stock, p- parameter;
O
(7) k - ï lt-s
s-1
where i- gross investments ( installation lag - 1 period), p- life
span.
Eqs. (2) to (5) lead to
1 t tik E
(A) mik - 1 t tlk ~ E Pyk 1 t tlk ERlk (NHI - j mij PYj ~ij)
j~i
j~k
where k~ i, k is one of the countries j and NHI and Pyk are endogenous.
As tik Z 0, it can be shown that, for given values of NHI, Pyk, ER, E~ 0,
an increase in tik causes a fall in mik, due to a fall in the outcome of
multiplication of the first two factors at the right hand side.
If in (A) two countries lower their mutual tariffs, their bilateral trade
goes up, and their imports out of the other countries fall cet. par., as
for the latter trade flow(s), the term in parentheses falls.
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